added extra OAuth2 avatar url download checks

This commit is contained in:
Gani Georgiev
2026-04-02 19:55:05 +03:00
parent 5cb66bd52f
commit cb44d9e716
4 changed files with 203 additions and 12 deletions

8
.github/SECURITY.md vendored
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@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ In case the vulnerability is confirmed, within another couple days I'll try to s
### Please:
- DO NOT use LLM as part of your report or email communication - it is extremely frustrating to spend an hour or more reading a wall of generated text, writing an elaborate reply and in the end to just receive another generic LLM prompt response in return.
- DO NOT use LLM as part of your report or email communication - it is extremely frustrating to spend an hour or more reading a wall of generated text, writing an elaborate reply and then to receive another generic LLM prompt response in return.
- DO NOT reserve and publish MITRE CVE number on your own _(I prefer to do it through the GitHub Security advisory)_ and try to communicate first privately the details to better understand how the code is being used and whether the supposed vulnerability can be actually exploited in any real practical scenarios. Otherwise you are risking needlessly causing scaremongering and annoyance for users that rely on security scanners as part of their CI/CD pipeline.
- Wait before publicly disclosing and sharing details about the found vulnerability, **ideally at least 5 days after the fix**, to make it harder to exploit and give enough time for users to patch their instances _(you are free to provide a PoC and as much details as you want in your own blog/gist/etc.)_.
### Below is a list of common vulnerabilities that were previously reported but are NOT considered a security issue:
### Below is a short list of previous reports that are NOT considered security issues:
<details>
<summary><strong>Stored XSS</strong></summary>
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ Because PocketBase v0.23+ supports automatically uploading the OAuth2 avatar on
The entire OAuth2 flow relies that the application server (PocketBase) trusts the configured OAuth2 vendor.
If you suspect that an OAuth2 vendor is malicious and cannot be trusted then you MUST NOT use that OAuth2 vendor at all and you should report it.
If someone is able to tamper with the OAuth2 responses then the entire OAuth2 flow can be thrown out of the window because they will be practically able to authenticate as any of your existing users and the eventual avatar url probing request is the least of your problem.
If someone is able to tamper with the OAuth2 responses then the entire OAuth2 flow can be thrown out of the window because they will be practically able to authenticate as any of your existing users and the eventual avatar URL probing request is the least of your problem.
_Nonetheless, in future PocketBase releases there will be [extra `localhost` domain like checks](https://github.com/orgs/pocketbase/projects/2/views/1?pane=issue&itemId=159545722) when assigning the OAuth2 avatar url to a `file` field that will further minimize the risk of internal network probing requests in case of a vulnerable OAuth2 provider._
~Nonetheless, in future PocketBase releases there will be [extra `localhost` domain like checks](https://github.com/orgs/pocketbase/projects/2/views/1?pane=issue&itemId=159545722) when assigning the OAuth2 avatar URL to a `file` field that will further minimize the risk of internal network probing requests in case of a vulnerable OAuth2 provider.~ _Done._
</details>
<details>

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
- (@todo) Bumped min Go GitHub action version to 1.26.2 because it comes with several [minor security fixes](https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.26.2).
- Other minor improvements _(updated `$apis.static` JSVM documentation, (@todo) added extra OAuth2 checks to prevent internal network probing requests in case of a malicious/vulnerable vendor, etc.)_.
- Other minor improvements _(updated `$apis.static` JSVM documentation, added extra OAuth2 checks when downloading the avatar URL to prevent internal network probing requests in case of a malicious/vulnerable vendor, etc.)_.
## v0.36.8

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@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
package apis
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"path"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
validation "github.com/go-ozzo/ozzo-validation/v4"
@@ -294,9 +299,12 @@ func oauth2Submit(e *core.RecordAuthWithOAuth2RequestEvent, optExternalAuth *cor
if mappedField != nil && mappedField.Type() == core.FieldTypeFile {
// download the avatar if the mapped field is a file
avatarFile, err := func() (*filesystem.File, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
return filesystem.NewFileFromURL(ctx, e.OAuth2User.AvatarURL)
// the extra checks are not required because the OAuth2 APIs are trusted vendor
// but are here to minimize the impact in case the provider is vulnerable
return safeFileFromURL(ctx, e.OAuth2User.AvatarURL)
}()
if err != nil {
txApp.Logger().Warn("Failed to retrieve OAuth2 avatar", slog.String("error", err.Error()))
@@ -399,3 +407,93 @@ func sendOAuth2RecordCreateRequest(txApp core.App, e *core.RecordAuthWithOAuth2R
return createdRecord, nil
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// safeHTTPClient initializes a custom http.Client with extra host checks
// to prevent internal network probing requests
// (aka. disallow loopback, private, multicast, etc. requests).
//
// NB! The host checks are not perfect and there are probably edge cases that are not covered,
// so if you plan using with untrusted user URL, consider performing additional whitelist checks.
//
// @todo Evaluate with the refactoring if worth exporting(+tests) and moving under the security package.
func safeHTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
dialer := &net.Dialer{
// the same options as in http.DefaultTransport.DialContext
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
// check the address right after estrablishing the connection to prevent dns rebinding
Control: func(network, address string, c syscall.RawConn) error {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil ||
ip.IsLoopback() ||
ip.IsUnspecified() ||
ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
ip.IsMulticast() {
return fmt.Errorf("address %q is invalid or not allowed", ip.String())
}
return nil
},
}
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 180 * time.Second, // can be still cancelled with the request context
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: dialer.DialContext,
// the same options as in http.DefaultTransport
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
MaxIdleConns: 100,
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
},
}
return client, nil
}
// safeFileFromURL downloads the file from the specified url (using safeHTTPClient)
// and creates a new filesystem.File value from its content (limited to DefaultMaxBodySize).
//
// @todo Evaluate with the refactoring if worth exporting/replacing filesystem.NewFileFromURL (or redefine as NewUnsafeFileFromURL).
func safeFileFromURL(ctx context.Context, url string) (*filesystem.File, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
client, err := safeHTTPClient()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
res, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode > 399 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to download url %s (%d)", url, res.StatusCode)
}
body := io.LimitReader(res.Body, DefaultMaxBodySize)
var buf bytes.Buffer
if _, err = io.Copy(&buf, body); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return filesystem.NewFileFromBytes(buf.Bytes(), path.Base(url))
}

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@@ -45,12 +45,14 @@ func TestRecordAuthWithOAuth2(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// start a test server
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(res http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
localServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(res http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
png.Encode(buf, image.Rect(0, 0, 1, 1)) // tiny 1x1 png
http.ServeContent(res, req, "test_avatar.png", time.Now(), bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()))
}))
defer server.Close()
defer localServer.Close()
externalImageURL := "https://pocketbase.io/images/logo.svg"
scenarios := []tests.ApiScenario{
{
@@ -1176,7 +1178,7 @@ func TestRecordAuthWithOAuth2(t *testing.T) {
Id: "oauth2_id",
Email: "oauth2@example.com",
Username: "oauth2_username",
AvatarURL: server.URL + "/oauth2_avatar.png",
AvatarURL: externalImageURL,
},
Token: &oauth2.Token{AccessToken: "abc"},
}
@@ -1208,7 +1210,98 @@ func TestRecordAuthWithOAuth2(t *testing.T) {
`"username":"oauth2_username"`,
`"verified":true`,
`"rel":"0yxhwia2amd8gec"`,
`"avatar":"oauth2_avatar_`,
`"avatar":"logo_`,
},
NotExpectedContent: []string{
// hidden fields
`"tokenKey"`,
`"password"`,
},
ExpectedEvents: map[string]int{
"*": 0,
"OnRecordAuthWithOAuth2Request": 1,
"OnRecordAuthRequest": 1,
"OnRecordCreateRequest": 1,
"OnRecordEnrich": 2, // the auth response and from the create request
// ---
"OnModelCreate": 3, // record + authOrigins + externalAuths
"OnModelCreateExecute": 3,
"OnModelAfterCreateSuccess": 3,
"OnRecordCreate": 3,
"OnRecordCreateExecute": 3,
"OnRecordAfterCreateSuccess": 3,
// ---
"OnModelUpdate": 1, // created record verified state change
"OnModelUpdateExecute": 1,
"OnModelAfterUpdateSuccess": 1,
"OnRecordUpdate": 1,
"OnRecordUpdateExecute": 1,
"OnRecordAfterUpdateSuccess": 1,
// ---
"OnModelValidate": 4,
"OnRecordValidate": 4,
},
},
{
Name: "creating user (with mapped OAuth2 fields and local avatarURL->file field; ensures that safeHTTPClient is being used)",
Method: http.MethodPost,
URL: "/api/collections/users/auth-with-oauth2",
Body: strings.NewReader(`{
"provider": "test",
"code":"123",
"redirectURL": "https://example.com",
"createData": {
"name": "test_name",
"emailVisibility": true,
"rel": "0yxhwia2amd8gec"
}
}`),
BeforeTestFunc: func(t testing.TB, app *tests.TestApp, e *core.ServeEvent) {
usersCol, err := app.FindCollectionByNameOrId("users")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// register the test provider
auth.Providers["test"] = func() auth.Provider {
return &oauth2MockProvider{
AuthUser: &auth.AuthUser{
Id: "oauth2_id",
Email: "oauth2@example.com",
Username: "oauth2_username",
AvatarURL: localServer.URL + "/oauth2_avatar.png", // local/private file download is not allowed
},
Token: &oauth2.Token{AccessToken: "abc"},
}
}
// add the test provider in the collection
usersCol.MFA.Enabled = false
usersCol.OAuth2.Enabled = true
usersCol.OAuth2.Providers = []core.OAuth2ProviderConfig{{
Name: "test",
ClientId: "123",
ClientSecret: "456",
}}
usersCol.OAuth2.MappedFields = core.OAuth2KnownFields{
Username: "name", // should be ignored because of the explicit submitted value
Id: "username",
AvatarURL: "avatar",
}
if err := app.Save(usersCol); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
},
ExpectedStatus: 200,
ExpectedContent: []string{
`"isNew":true`,
`"email":"oauth2@example.com"`,
`"emailVisibility":true`,
`"name":"test_name"`,
`"username":"oauth2_username"`,
`"verified":true`,
`"rel":"0yxhwia2amd8gec"`,
`"avatar":"`,
},
NotExpectedContent: []string{
// hidden fields
@@ -1343,7 +1436,7 @@ func TestRecordAuthWithOAuth2(t *testing.T) {
Email: "oauth2@example.com",
Username: "tESt2_username", // wouldn't match with existing because the related field index is case-sensitive
Name: "oauth2_name",
AvatarURL: server.URL + "/oauth2_avatar.png",
AvatarURL: localServer.URL + "/oauth2_avatar.png", // allowed because it is not being downloaded
},
Token: &oauth2.Token{AccessToken: "abc"},
}